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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY 83
The court has held in a few instances that the absence of the
accused was not reversible error, as where the accused was not in
the courtroom when the clerk called the names of the jurors who
had been selected,14 and where the court, having denied a motion
for a new trial, asked counsel for the accused if he desired to make
any further argument on the motion,15 the court holding in both
instances that such matters were not part of the trial as contem-
plated by the statute. In the case of State v. McHaffa,'8 where
court and counsel discussed in the absence of the accused a mo-
tion to direct an acquittal of a first degree murder charge, it was
not reversible error because clearly not prejudicial.
The Virginia court has held that where the accused was ab-
sent when motion for new trial was made and denied, but was after-
wards given the opportunity to make the motion again when
present, it was not reversible error.' 7  On similar facts, however, the
West Virginia court has held that this was error."8
In other jurisdictions the rule is generally not as strict as in
West Virginia, some holding that the accused may waive his right
to be present,19 and others that it is not reversible error to proceed
in the absence of the accused unless actual prejudice is shown.20
It would seem that the West Virginia rule is the better rule
because, while it occasionally puts the state to the expense of a
new trial, it assures the accused of a fairer and more impartial
trial by eliminating the possibility of anything prejudicial happen-
ing while he is absent, where under the other rules it would be
necessary to prove the prejudice or that he had waived his right
to be present.
J. C. A.
DIVORCE - DESERTION -' PENDENCY OF SUIT AS AFFECTING
CONTINUITY or DESERTION PERIOD. - W and H married in 1909.
W left the family home March 29, 1934, because of alleged cruel
treatment by H. On July 25, 1935, T sued H for separate main-
tenance. H filed a cross bill for absolute divorce on the ground
of desertion. The court sustained a demurrer to the cross bill be-
14 State v. Lucas, 103 W. Va. 793, 138 S. E. 393 (1927).
1r State v. Parsons, 39 W. Va. 464, 19 S. E. 876 (1894).
l 110 W. Va. 266, 157 S. E. 595 (1931).
17 Bond v. Commonwealth, 83 Va. 581, 3 S. E. 149 (1889).
is State v. Grove, 74 W. Va. 702, 82 S. E. 1019 (1914).) Hill v. State, 17 Wis. 675 (1864).
20 State v. Pierce, 123 N. C. 745, 31 S. E. 847 (1898).
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RECENT CASE COMMENTS
cause the statutory period of desertion was not complete, and upon
full proof dismissed W's bill. On August 25, 1936, H sued W for
divorce. Divorce granted. Held, that although the separate main-
tenance suit' interrupted the running of the statutory two-year
period,2 still after deducting the three months and seventeen days,
during which the action was pending, there remained more than
the necessary two years. Hewitt v. Hewitt.3
Earlier decisions of our court do not manifest such arithmetical
clarity. In Martin v. Martin4 the court allowed as part of the
statutory desertion period, the time in which the parties were in-
volved in bona fide litigation, as well as the time before filing of
that litigation. Later, in Vickers v. Vickers,' without taking notice
of the Martin case, the court held not only that the time of the
pendency of litigation between the parties cannot be counted as
part of the desertion period, but also stated in broad terms that
the period must have uninterrupted continuity,' which apparently
precludes counting the time prior to filing of suit.
As a general rule, courts have been unwilling to include in
the desertion period the time occupied by litigation between the
spouses.7  In this respect, the Vickers case is in accord with the
general rule, whereas Martin v. Martin is contra. Most courts
have also adopted the view that intervening litigation does not
deprive the abandoned spouse of the benefit of time elapsing be-
tween the initial desertion and the institution of the litigation.s
Our court in the Martin case recognized this proposition as sound,
but seems to have taken the opposite view in Vickers v. Vickers.'
1 It might be worth noting that most other cases speak of a suit for divorce
as interrupting the desertion period. See cases infra, n. 7. It is suggested
that the reason for giving the maintenance suit the same effect as a suit for
divorce is because the maintenance suit is one which affects the marital
relation.
2W. VA. REv. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 48, art. 2, § 4.
3 197 S. E. 297 (W. Va. 1938).
4 33 W. Va. 695, 11 S. B. 12 (1890).
95 W. Va. 323, 122 S. E. 279, 41 A. L. R. 266 (1924).
BId. at 328.
7Palmer v. Palmer, 36 la. 385, 18 So. 720 (1895) ; McLaughlin v. McLaugh-
lin, 90 N. J. Eq. 322, 107 Atl. 260 (1919); Sperling v. Sperling, 82 Pa. Super.
Ct. 308 (1923) ; Gilbert v. Gilbert, 108 Pa. Super. Ct. 351, 164 Atl. 103 (1933) ;
McKee v. McKee, 167 N. J. Eq. 1, 151 Atl. 620 (1930); Note (1926) 41 A. L.
R. 271.
8 Craig v. Craig, 118 Va. 284, 87 S. E. 727 (1915) ; Floberg v. Floberg, 358
Ill. 626, 193 N. E. 456 (1934) ; Woodward v. Woodward, 122 Fla. 300, 165 So.
46 (1935); Hartpence v. Hartpence, 121 Atl. 513 (N. J. Eq. 1923).
9 For a discussion of these contradictions see Colson, West Firginia Divorce
Law (1937) 43 W. VA. L. Q. 218.
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In Hewitt v. Hewitt our court, by expressly limiting the rule
of continuity in Vickers v. Vickers to apply in only those cases
containing an element of reconciliation or condonation, 0 and by
overruling that part of the Martin case which allows pendency of
litigation between the spouses to be counted, has adopted so much
of each as is in accord with prevailing opinion. Thus, the result is
a rule which is free from inconsistencies and easy to apply. As one
court succinctly remarked, "It is like 'time out' in a football game,
and if, after taking 'time out', there is at least two years left, the
requirement of the statute is met.'1  C. E. G.
TRUSTS - FmUCIARIES - RIGHT OF FIDucIARY TO COLLECT
EXTRA COMPENSATION FOR LEGAL SRVIcEs. - P, an attorney, per-
formed legal services for decedent's estate of which he was one of
three co-executors, these services having been rendered with the
consent of one of the other two. P petitioned for compensation for
these services in addition to the fee of $750 allowed to him for
his work as executor. The commissioner found the legal services
worth $2,000, but the chancellor disallowed the claim. P appealed.
Reversed. Held, that a liberal construction of the statutel allowing
a fiduciary any reasonable expenses incurred by him as such per-
mits an executor rendering valuable legal services to the estate to
be paid a reasonable compensation therefor as a part of his execu-
tor's fee. Tyler v. Reynolds.2
It has long been an established principle in equity that an
executor or administrator who acts as attorney for the estate can
receive no extra compensation for services rendered by him in that
capacity,' This view is predicated primarily on the fear held by
courts that "the administrator in selecting himself to perform the
duties of an attorney for the estate would become his own employer,
and would be under temptation of self-interest which might lead
him to act contrary to the duties of his trust.' Today, there is
lo Burk v. Burk, 21 W. Va. 445 (1883); Phelan v. Phelan, 135 Ill. 445, 25
N. E. 751 (1890); Note (1912) 39 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1133.
11 Hartpence v. Hartpence, 121 Atl. 513, 514 (N. J. Eq. 1923).
1 W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) e. 44, art. 4, § 14.
2 197 S. E. 735 (W. Va. 1938).
3 Baldwin's Ex'r v. Carleton, 15 La. 394 (1840) ; Willard v. Bassett, Adm'r,
27 Ill. 37, 79 Am. Dec. 393 (1861); Doss v. Stevens, 13 Colo. App. 535, 59
Pac. 67 (1899); Estate of Lankershim, 6 Cal. (2d) 568, 58 P. (2d) 1282
(1936).
4 Estate of Lankershim, 6 Cal. (2d) 568, 572, 58 P. (2d) 1282 (1936).
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